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a b s t r a c t
We study a problem of scheduling client requests to servers. Each client has a particular
latency requirement at each server and may choose either to be assigned to some server
in order to get serviced provided that her latency requirement is met, or not to participate
in the assignment at all. From a global perspective, in order to optimize the performance
of such a system, one would aim to maximize the number of clients that participate in the
assignment. However, clients may behave selfishly in the sense that, each of them simply
aims to participate in an assignment and get serviced by some server where her latency
requirement is met with no regard to overall system performance. We model this selfish
behavior as a strategic game, show how to compute pure Nash equilibria efficiently, and
assess the impact of selfishness on system performance. We also show that the problem of
optimizing performance is computationally hard to solve, even in a coordinated way, and
present efficient approximation and online algorithms.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
We are motivated by the following scenario where clients aim to retrieve some objects (e.g., video/audio files) from
servers (each server can be thought of as an electronic store). Each client requests one object which may exist in some of
the servers. In order to get serviced, the client has to connect to the server and download the object. The service time (or
latency) for a client connected to a server is proportional to the number of simultaneous connections to that server. Clients
may value differently the service received from each server in the sense that if the latency is high enough, the client may
decide not to receive the object from that server and close the connection. A clientmay connect to a server and download the
requested object if the current load of the server is within her valuation criterion; of course, this action could inconvenience
some other client connected to the server who will decide not to get serviced by that server and will make another choice.
A client decides not to get serviced at all if no server meets her valuation criterion.
Naturally, such a scenario of selfish behavior can be modeled using the notion of a strategic game from game theory. We
define a particular class of games called SMP games. In an SMP game, we have a set of clients C and a set of serversM. Each
client has the following possible strategies: either to be assigned to one of the servers ofM or not to be assigned to any server.
Each client c ∈ C has a non-negative finite integer latency bound `kc at each server k ∈ M. Clients are non-cooperative in the
sense that each client wishes to be assigned to some server where her latency bound is satisfied; otherwise, she prefers not
to be assigned to any server. An SMP game is defined by the following payoff function for each client: given an assignment
of some of the clients to servers
• a client that is not assigned to any server has zero payoff;
• a client assigned to a server k together with nk − 1 other clients has payoff 1 if `kc ≥ nk and payoff−1 otherwise.
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The selection of −1 as a payoff stems from our motivating scenario where a client decides not to get serviced at all if no
server meets her valuation criterion.
Readers familiar with congestion gameswill observe that SMP games can be expressed as congestion gameswith player-
specific latency functions [20] of a very particular form. However, the results known for such games in the literature are quite
general and do not imply any of the results in this paper. We say that an assignment is valid if no client has payoff −1. An
assignment is a pure Nash equilibrium for an SMP game if no client has an incentive to unilaterally change her strategy. In
this paper, we focus on pure Nash equilibria as opposed tomore general equilibria (mixed, correlated, etc.). In the following,
the term equilibrium is used a synonym for the term “pure Nash equilibrium”.
Clearly, any equilibrium is a valid assignment. The benefit of an assignment for an SMP game is the sum of the payoffs
of all clients. Hence, the benefit of a valid assignment equals the number of clients accommodated in servers. We use the
notion of the price of anarchy introduced in [22] (see also [17]) to assess the quality of equilibria of SMP games. The price of
anarchy of an SMP game is defined as the ratio of the benefit of an optimal assignment for the SMP game over the benefit
of the worst equilibrium.
Selfish behavior could be bypassed by having a scheduler who knows the load of each of the available servers, receives
the requests of the clients for objects together with their latency bound for each server, and coordinates the assignment
of clients to servers. Although such an approach would be inappropriate and unrealistic in a networked environment, it is
important to consider it in order to compare it with the uncoordinated case and assess selfish behavior. Furthermore, it
gives rise to an interesting combinatorial optimization problem which we call scheduling to maximize participation (SMP).
Although scheduling optimization problems (focusing mainly on minimizing some function of the server latencies when all
clients must be assigned to some server, e.g., see [18]) and corresponding games (such as load balancing [6,8,12,13,16,17,
19] and congestion games [1,7,23]) have been extensively studied in the literature, to the best of our knowledge, SMP has
not been studied before.
Our main motivating question concerns the construction of efficient equilibria and valid assignments in SMP games.
In Section 2, we present a Nashification technique which, starting from a valid assignment, converges to an equilibrium
by making a polynomial number of client moves. This is motivated by [12] where a similar in spirit technique has been
applied to a different scheduling game. An important property of our Nashification technique is that the benefit of the
equilibrium computed is not smaller than the benefit of the initial assignment. So, in order to compute equilibria of large
benefit, it suffices to compute valid assignments of large benefit. We use the term SMP to refer to the optimization problem
of computing a valid assignment ofmaximumbenefit; Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to the study of SMP in the offline and the
online case. Two optimization problems are of interest here, namely, to find the best and the worst equilibrium in an SMP
game, i.e., an equilibrium of maximum and minimum benefit, respectively. Our results include interesting statements for
these problems as well. In Section 2, we also prove that the price of anarchy of SMP games is at most 2. This means that any
equilibriumhas as benefit at least half of the benefit of the best equilibrium and, hence, the Nashification technique provides
a simple 2-approximation algorithm for computing the best and the worst equilibrium. On the negative side, we prove that
both problems are APX-hard meaning that it is hard to find an equilibrium whose benefit is close to the benefit of the best
or the worst equilibrium. This is explicitly proved in Section 2 for the problem of computing the worst equilibrium using
a reduction from minimum maximal bipartite matching. The hardness of the problem of computing the best equilibrium
follows by the APX-hardness of SMP (see below).
In Section 3, we present a e
e−1 ≈ 1.58-approximation SMP algorithm based on linear programming and randomized
rounding. SMP can be thought of as a special case of combinatorial auctions. In the problem of combinatorial auctions, we
have a set of players and a set of items. A feasible allocation assigns every item to at most one player. For every player, her
utility function wi is defined over the set of items that she receives. The goal is to find a feasible allocation that maximizes
social welfare
∑
i wi(Si), where Si is the set of items allocated to player i. In SMP, the servers correspond to players and the
clients correspond to items; the utility of a set of clients for a server is themaximum number of clients from this set that can
be assigned to the server in any valid assignment. Recentwork [9–11] presents e
e−1 -approximation algorithms (also based on
linear programming and randomized rounding) for combinatorial auctionswhen the utility functions have special properties
(e.g., subadditivity). However, these techniques are rather impractical since they make use of the ellipsoid method in order
to solve the corresponding linear programming relaxation which is of exponential size. The LP corresponding to SMP has
also an exponential number of variables. In this paper, for SMP, we exploit the structure of the problem and prove that SMP
is equivalent to a constrained integral flow problem whose LP relaxation is of polynomial size and, hence, it can be solved
by practical linear programming algorithms. Then, randomized rounding in our case is simpler compared to [9–11]. On the
negative side, we show that the problem is APX-hard by showing an explicit inapproximability result of 368/367 using
a reduction from multidimensional matching. Since an equilibrium is a valid assignment and our Nashification technique
guarantees that the maximum benefit is achieved by a valid assignment that is also an equilibrium, this result also implies
the APX-hardness of the problem of computing the best equilibrium for an SMP game.
In Section 4,we consider the online version of SMPwhere clients (togetherwith their latency bound vector) appear online
and a decision has to be made when each client appears. This can be thought of as the problem of computing an efficient
valid assignment for an SMP gamewhen information about the game is gradually revealed to the algorithm.We distinguish
between non-preemptive and preemptive online algorithms. When a client c appears, a non-preemptive online algorithm
can either reject c or put it in a server so that neither the latency bounds of previously assigned clients nor the latency
bound of client c is violated. A preemptive online algorithm may alternatively decide to preempt (i.e., reject) a previously
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accepted client and replace it with c provided that the latency bound of c is not violated. The power of preemption in
online computation has also been investigated in different contexts (e.g., see [14]). Intuitively, although a preemption does
not increase the benefit, it may “correct” previous decisions of the algorithm. Here, we assess the quality of the solution
in terms of the competitive ratio [4] (or competitiveness) defined as the maximum over all SMP sequences of the ratio of
the optimal benefit over the expected benefit of the assignment computed by the algorithm. In general, we assume that
sequences are generated by oblivious adversaries who may have knowledge of the probability distribution that may be
used by the algorithm but have no access to its random choices (if any). The online version is inherently more difficult
to approximate by non-preemptive algorithms since, as we prove, no deterministic non-preemptive algorithm is better
than T-competitive while no randomized non-preemptive algorithm can be better than HT-competitive against oblivious
adversaries, where T is the ratio of themaximum over theminimumnon-zero latency bound over all clients and servers and
H is the harmonic function. On the positive side, we show an asymptotically tight upper bound by presenting an O(ln T)-
competitive randomized non-preemptive algorithm that needs to know T in advance. In the case where no information
about T is known in advance, a slightly inferior competitiveness bound is obtained. These online algorithms are based on
the classify-and-randomly-select paradigm (see [4])which has been proved to be useful in other problems (e.g., call admission
control in communication networks [2,3], online independent set problems [5], etc.). When preemption is allowed we
show that constant competitiveness can be achieved even by deterministic algorithms. We present a 5-competitive online
algorithm and a lower bound of 3 for any deterministic online algorithm. We also give a slightly weaker lower bound of e
e−1
for randomized algorithms; our analysis makes use of an interesting martingale argument.
We conclude by presenting interesting open problems in Section 5.
2. Equilibria and price of anarchy
We begin by presenting our Nashification technique.We describe algorithmNashifywhich starts from a valid assignment
for an SMP game consisting of a set C of n clients and a setM ofm servers andworks as follows. It proceeds in rounds. Denote
by nik the number of clients assigned to server k at the beginning of round i. In each round, algorithm Nashify performs one
step for each server k ∈ M. In each step of a round i, at most twomoves are performed. If there exists a client c not assigned to
any server which has latency bound lkc > n
i
k, cmoves to server k. This move of client cmay violate the latency bound of some
clients that are already in server k. If this is true, we pick one such client c′ with lkc′ = nik (i.e., her latency bound is violated
by the move of client c), and move it out of server k (without assigning it to any server). Algorithm Nashify terminates when
no move is performed during a whole round. We prove the following statement.
Theorem 1 (Nashification). For any SMP gamewith n clients andm servers, algorithmNashify computes an equilibriumof benefit
not smaller than the benefit of the initial assignment by performing at most 2 nmmoves.
Proof. The assignment produced by algorithm Nashify is valid since the condition that the number of clients in any server
is not greater than the latency bound of each client assigned to this server remains true after each step of the algorithm.
It is also an equilibrium since, by the termination criterion, no unassigned client has an incentive to move to any server.
Furthermore, during a step, a client may move out of a server only if another client moves to this server. Hence, the benefit
of the final assignment is not smaller than the benefit of the initial one. In order to prove the upper bound on the total
number of moves, observe that a client c that moves out of a server k at some round i has lkc = nik. Since the number of clients
at server k never decreases in later rounds, client cwill never move to server k again. So, the total number of moves each of
the n clients can make is at most 2m (one move in and one move out for each of the m servers). 
Implicitly, in the proof of Theorem 1 we also prove that SMP games always have equilibria. The next result states that their
benefit is fairly large.
Theorem 2. The price of anarchy of any SMP game is at most 2.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium for an SMP game on a set of servers M and an optimal assignment. We denote by oj the
number of clients that are in server j in the optimal assignment. Let nj be the number of clients in server j in the equilibrium
and Rj be the set of clients that are in server j in the optimal assignment but are not assigned to any server in the equilibrium.
Consider a client c ∈ Rj for some server j. Since c is in server j in the optimal assignment, it holds that `jc ≥ oj. Since c is not
assigned to any server in the equilibrium, it holds that `jc ≤ nj, otherwise cwould have an incentive tomove to server j. Thus,
we have that oj ≤ nj for any server j for which Rj 6= ∅. It holds that∑
j∈M
oj =
∑
j∈M:Rj=∅
oj +
∑
j∈M:Rj 6=∅
oj
≤ ∑
j∈M:Rj=∅
oj +
∑
j∈M:Rj 6=∅
nj
≤ ∑
j∈M
nj +
∑
j∈M:Rj 6=∅
nj
≤ 2∑
j∈M
nj. 
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The above result is tight since there exists a simple matching lower bound consisting of two servers a, b and two clients x, y
with `ax = `bx = `ay = 1 and `by = 0. In the optimal solution, x is assigned to b and y is assigned to a, while the assignment
where x is assigned to a and y is not assigned to any server is an equilibrium.
AlgorithmNashify is essentially a 2-approximation algorithm for computing the best equilibrium for SMP games. Starting
from any initial valid assignment for an SMP game, it computes an equilibrium which (by Theorem 2) has benefit at least
half the optimal benefit. In Section 3, we present an algorithm that computes a valid assignment of benefit at most 1.58
times smaller than the optimal benefit. Combined with algorithm Nashify, this yields a 1.58-approximation algorithm for
computing the best equilibrium for SMP games. Clearly, algorithmNashify is also a 2-approximation algorithm for computing
the worst equilibrium for SMP games.
Concerning the hardness of approximation of the problem of computing the best equilibrium for SMP games, this follows
by a statement in the next section where we show that the problem of computing the best valid assignment is APX-hard.
The next theorem shows that the problem of computing the worst equilibrium is APX-hard as well.
Theorem 3. The problem of computing the worst equilibrium for SMP games is APX-hard.
Proof. We will show that there are instances of the problem which are equivalent to instances of minimum maximal
bipartite matching which is known to be APX-hard [24]. An instance of minimum maximal bipartite matching consists
of a bipartite graph G(U, V, E) and the objective is to compute a maximal matching of minimum size. A matching is called
maximal if we cannot obtain another matching by adding one extra edge to it. Consider such an instance consisting of a
bipartite graph G(U, V, E) and construct an SMP game consisting of a client for each node of U and a server for each node of
V . The latency bound of a client corresponding to a node u ∈ U is 1 to each server corresponding to a node v ∈ V such that
(u, v) ∈ E and 0 otherwise.
Wewill show that there exists amaximalmatching in G of size K if and only if the SMP game has an equilibrium of benefit
K. Consider a maximal matching M in G consisting of K edges. Then, an equilibrium for the SMP game is defined as follows.
For each edge (u, v) in the matching, the client corresponding to node u is assigned to the server corresponding to node v.
The fact that M is a matching guarantees that each client is assigned to at most one server and each server receives at most
one client, i.e., the assignment is valid. In order to prove that it is also an equilibrium, observe that since the matching is
maximal there is no edge (u, v) ∈ E\M such that neither u nor v is an endpoint of an edge in M. Hence, no client that is not
assigned to any server has an incentive to move to some server. Similarly, consider an equilibrium for the SMP game. Each
client is assigned to at most one server and, by the definition of the latency bounds, each server contains at most one client.
Hence, the set consisting of the edges (u, v)where v ∈ V corresponds to a server containing the client corresponding to node
u ∈ U is a matching in G. Since the assignment is an equilibrium, no client c among those that are not assigned to any server
has an incentive to move to some server k such that `kc = 1 because server k already contains some other client. This implies
that all edges in E\M are adjacent to some edge in M which means that M is maximal. 
3. Computation of efficient valid assignments
In this section, we study the complexity of computing valid assignments for SMP instances. We first present an
approximation algorithm which is based on linear programming and randomized rounding and achieves an approximation
guarantee of e
e−1 ≈ 1.58.
We start with an informal overview of the technique. Given an instance of SMP, we first express the problem as an
equivalent integer linear program (ILP). (ILP) has an exponential number of variables corresponding to the enormous number
of possible different assignments of clients to servers. In order to handle this difficulty, we show that (ILP) is equivalent
to a constrained integral flow problem on a particular network. The variables of (ILP) correspond to flow paths in the
network; their number is still exponential, but a polynomial number of flow constraints is enough to characterize them.
Still, we cannot hope to solve this constrained integral flow problem, either. So, we ignore the integrality constraints
and obtain a constrained fractional flow problem in the same network. This is then solved using linear programming,
and the fractional solution obtained is transformed to a fractional solution for the linear programming relaxation of
(ILP) where the integrality constraint has been ignored. This fractional solution is rounded to a feasible integral solution
for (ILP) in a well-defined randomized way. The benefit of this solution is proved to be at least 1 − 1
e
times the
optimal benefit.
Given an instance of SMP consisting of a set C of n clients and a setM ofm servers, we say that a non-empty set of clients
A ⊆ C is valid for server k ∈ M if `kc ≥ |A| for each client c ∈ A. Hence, a valid set for server k is a set of clients which can
be accommodated in server k in a solution of SMP. Now, SMP is to select one valid set of clients for each server so that the
valid sets selected are disjoint and the total number of clients in valid sets selected is maximized. This is equivalent to the
following integer linear program:
(ILP) maximize
∑
k∈M
∑
A∈Ak
xkA|A|
subject to
∑
k∈M
∑
A∈Ak:c∈A
xkA ≤ 1, for any c ∈ C
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A∈Ak
xkA ≤ 1, for any k ∈ M
xkA ∈ {0, 1}, for any k ∈ M and A ∈ Ak.
whereAk denotes the set of valid sets for server k. The variable xkA denotes whether the valid set A is selected at server k. The
constraints guarantee that each client is assigned to at most one server (i.e., it belongs to at most one valid set) and that at
most one valid set is selected for each server.
We will first show that (ILP) is equivalent to a constrained integral flow problem in a particular polynomially sized
network N presented in the following. For each server k = 1, . . . ,m the network has three nodes sk (called the source node
associated with server k), s′k, and tk (called the sink node associated with server k) and, for each i = 1, . . . , n, it has two nodes
uki and vki . For each server k = 1, . . . ,m, node sk is connected through a directed link to node s′k, and for each i = 1, . . . , n,
node s′k is connected through a directed link to node uki , while node vki is connected through a directed link to node tk. For each
server k = 1, . . . ,m, each i = 1, . . . , n, each j = 1, . . . , i, and each client c ∈ C, the network has two nodeswki (c, j) and zki (c, j).
For each server k = 1, . . . ,m and each i = 1, . . . , n, node uki is connected through a directed link to all nodes wki (c, 1) for
each client c such that `kc ≥ i. All nodes zki (c, i) are connected through a directed link to node vki . For each server k = 1, . . . ,m,
each i = 1, . . . , n, and each j = 1, . . . , i, node wki (c, j) is connected to node zki (c, j). For each server k = 1, . . . ,m, we fix
an ordering pik of the clients in C (i.e., pik assigns a distinct integer in {1, 2, . . . , n} to each client) such that pik(c′) > pik(c)
implies `kc′ ≥ `kc . For each server k = 1, . . . ,m, each i = 2, . . . , n, and each j = 1, . . . , i−1, node zki (c, j) is connected to nodes
wki (c
′, j+ 1) for all clients c′ with pik(c′) > pik(c). All edges have unit capacity. The edge connecting nodes wki (c, j) and zki (c, j)
(for some client c ∈ C, each server k = 1, . . . ,m, each i = 1, . . . , n, and each j = 1, . . . , i) belongs to the edge-set Ec of client
c. Such edges are called client edges. An example of this construction is presented in Fig. 1.
This construction is such that there is an 1 − 1 correspondence between a valid set of clients and source-sink paths
in N. Indeed, consider a valid set of clients A = {c1, c2, . . . , ci} for server k and assume without loss of generality that
pik(cj) < pik(cj+1), for j = 1, . . . , i − 1. Since A is a valid set for server k with i > 0 clients, it is `kc1 ≥ i and, therefore,
there is a directed link from uki to wki (c1, 1). For j = 1, . . . , i − 1, the inequality pik(cj) < pik(cj+1) implies that there is a
directed link from zki (cj, j) to wki (cj+1, j + 1). Directed links from wki (cj, j) to zki (cj, j) for j = 1, . . . , i, as well as directed links
from sk to s′k, from s′k to uki , from zki (ci, i) to vki , and from vki to tk exist by the definition of the network. Thus, nodes sk and tk are
connected through the path〈
sk, s
′
k, u
k
i ,w
k
i (c1, 1), z
k
i (c1, 1),w
k
i (c2, 2), z
k
i (c2, 2), . . . ,w
k
i (ci, i), z
k
i (ci, i), v
k
i , tk
〉
.
Similarly, consider a path p from node sk to node tk in network N. By the definition of the network, the path consists of the
subpath
〈
sk, s′k, uki
〉
, a subpath
p′ =
〈
uki ,w
k
i (c1, 1), z
k
i (c1, 1),w
k
i (c2, 2), z
k
i (c2, 2), . . . ,w
k
i (ci, i), z
k
i (ci, i), v
k
i
〉
connecting node uki to node vki , and the subpath
〈
vki , tk
〉
for some i. The client edges in subpath p′ belong to different clients
since an edge connecting node zki (cj, j) to wki (cj+1, j + 1) implies that pik(cj) < pik(cj+1). Consequently (by the definition of
pik), it holds that `kcj ≤ `kcj+1 for j = 1, . . . , i− 1. Furthermore, an edge connecting node uki to wki (c1, 1) implies that `kc1 ≥ i. So,
it holds that `kcj ≥ i for j = 1, . . . , i, i.e., the set of clients {c1, c2, . . . , ci} is valid.
Now, SMP can be thought of as the following constrained integral flow problem: the objective is to push flow f from the
source nodes to the sink nodes so that the flow fe carried by each edge e is integral, the capacity constraints are maintained
(i.e., fe ≤ 1 for each edge e), the total flow carried by all edges in the edge-set Ec is at most 1 for each client c ∈ C, and the
quantity
∑
k∈M
∑n
i=1 i · f(vki ,tk) is maximized. The constraints imply that the solution to the constrained integral flow problem
will consist of at most one path connecting each source node to its corresponding sink node so that the client edges in these
paths belong to different clients. The quantity to be maximized equals the number of client edges that carry some flow.
Equivalently, we obtain at most one valid set of clients per server so that the valid sets are disjoint and contain a maximum
number of clients for the original SMP instance.
Since, as we show later in this section, SMP is APX-hard, we cannot hope to solve optimally the constrained integral flow
problem. Instead, we relax the integrality constraint and solve the corresponding constrained fractional flow problem by
transforming it to a linear program. Here, the variables of the linear program represent the flow fe carried by each edge e and
the constraints of the linear program are either flow conservation constraints at the network nodes, or capacity constraints
at the network edges, or require that the total flow carried by the edges of the edge-set of any client is at most 1. Note that,
although (ILP) has an exponential number of variables, the constrained fractional flow problem can be expressed as a linear
programwith polynomial number of variables and constraints since the network constructed has at most O(n3m) nodes and
O(n4m) edges.
Once we have a solution to the constrained fractional flow problem, we can obtain a solution to the linear programming
relaxation of (ILP) obtained by relaxing the integrality constraint to xkA ≥ 0. This can be done by decomposing the flow into
flow paths using a folklore path stripping technique. For k = 1, . . . ,m, we pick the edge e carrying the smallest non-zero
amount of flow between nodes sk and tk and compute a path p from sk to tk that contains e and consists of edges carrying
non-zero amounts of flow. We set the flow carried by the flow path p to fˆp = fe and decrease the flow on each edge in p
by fe. We repeat this procedure and decompose all flow between nodes sk and tk into flow paths. Note that the number of
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Fig. 1. The corresponding network constructed by the algorithm of Section 3 for an instance of SMP with two servers 1 and 2 and three clients c1, c2, c3
with latency bounds `1c1 = 0, `2c1 = 3, `1c2 = 2, `2c2 = 0, `1c3 = 1, and `2c3 = 2. The ordering in each server is defined as pi1(c1) = 1, pi1(c2) = 3,
pi1(c3) = 2 and pi2(c1) = 3, pi2(c2) = 1, pi2(c3) = 2. An optimal solution to the corresponding constrained integral flow problem consists of the
paths 〈s1, s′1, u11,w11(c2, 1), z11(c2, 1), v11, t1〉 and 〈s2, s′2, u22,w22(c3, 1), z22(c3, 1),w22(c1, 2), z22(c1, 2), v22, t2〉 corresponding to the assignment of client c2
to server 1 and clients c1 and c3 to server 2.
paths obtained in this way is not greater than the number of edges in the network since, in each step, the flow variable of
some edge is decreased to zero. After performing path stripping, we obtain a fractional solution to the linear programming
relaxation of (ILP) by setting xkA = fˆp for each valid set of clients A corresponding to a flow path p carrying a non-zero amount
of flow fˆp between nodes sk and tk and implicitly setting all other variables to 0.
In order to obtain an integral feasible solution to (ILP), we will use randomized rounding. Due to the special structure
of SMP, randomized rounding and its analysis are simpler compared to [9–11]. We cast a die for each server k having one
face for each valid set A ∈ Ak with xkA > 0 (with probability that this face is the outcome of the die-casting equal to xkA)
and an additional face corresponding to the fact that no client is accepted at server k (with the probability that this face is
the outcome of the die-casting equal to 1−∑A∈Ak xkA). After performing die-castings for all servers, we perform a correction
procedure by assigning each client c to that server k (if any) where a set containing client c is the outcome of the die-casting
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for server k; if more than one die-castings have outcomes containing the same client, then client c is assigned to one of the
corresponding servers arbitrarily. The assignment produced is valid since the first set of constraints of (ILP) is guaranteed by
the correction procedure while the second set of constraints is guaranteed by the way randomized rounding is performed.
Clearly, all sets produced by the correction procedure are valid since removing a client from a valid set still gives a valid set
of clients.
Lemma 4. Given an instance of SMP, the algorithm computes a valid assignment with expected benefit at least 1 − 1
e
times the
optimal benefit.
Proof. Denote by Yc the 0/1 random variable denoting whether client c is contained in some of the valid sets selected after
the application of randomized rounding. The probability that a client is contained in some of the valid sets for server k
selected after the randomized rounding is
∑
A∈Ak:c∈A x
k
A and, since die-castings are performed independently, the probability
that a client c ∈ C is contained in some of the valid sets selected after randomized rounding is
Pr[Yc = 1] = 1−
∏
k∈M
(
1− ∑
A∈Ak:c∈A
xkA
)
≥ 1− exp
(
−∑
k∈M
∑
A∈Ak:c∈A
xkA
)
where the inequality follows since
∏n
i=1 (1− xi) ≤ exp
(−∑ni=1 xi)when xi ∈ [0, 1].
Denote by xˆkA the solution obtained after the application of the correction procedure. Since a client that is contained in
some valid set selected by the randomized rounding procedure also appears in exactly one valid set after the correction
procedure, the benefit of the final solution is
∑
k∈M
∑
A∈Ak xˆ
k
A|A| =
∑
c∈C Yc. Hence, we obtain that the expected benefit of the
final solution is
E
[∑
k∈M
∑
A∈Ak
xˆkA|A|
]
= E
[∑
c∈C
Yc
]
= ∑
c∈C
Pr[Yc = 1]
≥ ∑
c∈C
(
1− exp
(
−∑
k∈M
∑
A∈Ak:c∈A
xkA
))
≥ ∑
c∈C
(
1− e−1
)∑
k∈M
∑
A∈Ak:c∈A
xkA
=
(
1− e−1
)∑
c∈C
∑
k∈M
∑
A∈Ak:c∈A
xkA
=
(
1− e−1
)∑
k∈M
∑
A∈Ak
xkA|A|
≥
(
1− e−1
)∑
k∈M
∑
A∈Ak
x∗kA |A|
where x∗ denotes the optimal integral SMP solution. The second inequality follows since 1 − exp(−x) ≥ (1 − e−1)x when
x ∈ [0, 1] and due to the constraint of the linear program. The last inequality follows since the benefit of the optimal integral
SMP solution x∗ is upper-bounded by the value of the optimal solution x of the linear programming relaxation of (ILP). 
The algorithm can be forced to obtain a ratio which is within any constant  > 0 close to e
e−1 with high probability by
applying the randomized rounding procedure O(1/) times; this follows by a simple application of the Markov inequality
[21]. The next statement summarizes the discussion in this section.
Theorem 5. There exists an e
e−1 ≈ 1.58-approximation algorithm for SMP.
On the negative side, we show that SMP is APX-hard by providing an explicit inapproximability bound.
Theorem 6. For any  > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate SMP within 368/367− .
Proof. We use a reduction from 6-dimensional matching which is known to be APX-hard. An instance of 6-dimensional
matching consists of a 6-uniform 6-partite hypergraph G and the objective is to compute a matching of maximum size in G
(i.e., a set of hyperedges of maximum cardinality in which no two of them share any node). In particular, [15] shows that
there exist instances of 6-dimensional matching consisting of a 6-uniform 6-partite hypergraph with n nodes and n/2 edges
for which, for any  ∈ (0, 1/46), it is NP-hard to decide whether themaximummatching has size at least (1−) n6 or at most(
22
23 + 
)
n
6 .
Given such an instance I6DM of 6-dimensional matching consisting of a hypergraph G, we construct the instance ISMP of
SMP that contains a server for each hyperedge of G, a client for each node of G and 5n2 additional clients. Each of the additional
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clients has latency bound 5 at all servers while the client corresponding to node v of G has latency bound 6 at each server
corresponding to hyperedges of G containing v and latency bound 5 at all other servers.
We say that a solution to ISMP is maximal if it contains at least 5 clients per server. Note that given a solution to ISMP , we
can compute amaximal solution of at least the same benefit by accommodating additional clients to the servers that contain
less than 5 clients. We observe that any solution for I6DM of cardinality K can be converted to a maximal solution for ISMP of
benefit 5n2 + K by assigning to each server corresponding to a hyperedge in the solution of I6DM the clients corresponding to
nodes contained in the hyperedge and 5 of the additional clients to any other server. Similarly, anymaximal solution for ISMP
of benefit 5n2 +K can be converted to a solution for I6DM of cardinality K by simply considering the hyperedges corresponding
to servers with 6 clients. Hence, if for some  ∈ (0, 1/46) we could decide whether the optimal benefit for ISMP is above(
368
23 − 
)
n
6 or below
(
367
23 + 
)
n
6 then we could also decide whether the maximummatching in I6DM has cardinality at least(
368
23 − 
)
n
6 − 5n2 = (1− ) n6 or at most
(
367
23 + 
)
n
6 − 5n2 =
(
22
23 + 
)
n
6 . 
Notice that the proof of Theorem 6 reduces instances of 6-dimensional matching to instances of SMPwhere latency bounds
of clients are 5 or 6. We remark that a similar reduction from 3-dimensional matching (which is also APX-hard [15]) also
yields that SMP is APX-hard, albeit with a weaker explicit inapproximability bound.
4. Online algorithms
In this section we consider the online version of SMP. In particular, we distinguish between two cases depending on
whether preemption is allowed or not.
4.1. Non-preemptive online algorithms
We first observe that non-preemptive deterministic online algorithms for SMP are at least T-competitive, where T is the
ratio of the maximum over the minimum latency bound over all clients. To see this, consider an instance of SMP where a
single server is available, a deterministic algorithm A and an offline adversaryADV working as follows. First, the adversary
presents one client of latency bound 1. If the algorithm A rejects the client, the adversary stops the sequence; in this case A
has no benefit. Otherwise (i.e., if A accepts the client), the adversary presents T additional clients, each with latency bound
T. Since preemption is not allowed, algorithm A cannot accept any more clients. Hence, its benefit is 1 while the optimal
benefit is T.
Next, we prove a lower bound on the competitive ratio of any randomized non-preemptive online SMP algorithm against
oblivious adversaries. We apply Yao’s minimax principle (see [4,21]), which essentially states that in order to prove lower
bounds for randomized algorithms it suffices to prove lower bounds for deterministic algorithms on sequences of clients
produced according to some probability distribution. In particular, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 7 (Yao’s Minimax Principle [4,21]). Given a probability distribution P over sequences of clients, denote by EP [BA] and
EP [BOPT] the expected benefit of a deterministic algorithm A and the expected optimal benefit on sequences of clients generated
according to P . Define the competitiveness cPA of A under P to be
cPA =
EP [BOPT]
EP [BA]
and let c be the minimum of cPA over all deterministic algorithms A. Then, c is a lower bound on the competitiveness of any
randomized algorithm AR against an oblivious adversary.
Our lower bound is the following.
Theorem 8. Any (possibly randomized) non-preemptive online SMP algorithm has a competitive ratio of at least HT against
oblivious adversaries, where T is the ratio of the maximum over the minimum latency bound over all clients and servers.
Proof. Wewill prove that there exists an adversaryADV that presents sequences of clients with latency bounds between 1
and T according to a probability distributionP in such a way that no deterministic non-preemptive algorithm can be better
than HT–competitive under P . Then, the theorem will follow by Lemma 7.
The adversaryADV runs at most T phases at a single server. At phase i, 1 ≤ i ≤ T, it presents i clients of latency bound
i. The adversary ADV starts with phase 1. After running phase i with 1 ≤ i ≤ T − 1, ADV tosses a coin with probability
Pr[heads] = 1
i+1 . On heads, it stops the sequence; on tails, it proceeds to phase i+ 1. After having run phase T, the adversary
ADV stops the sequence.
Consider an algorithm and assume that the first client it accepts belongs to phase i. Since the latency bound of this client is
i, the algorithm cannot acceptmore than i−1 additional clients (of either phase i or subsequent phases). So, no algorithm can
do better than accepting all clients of phase i. Thus, in order to prove the lower bound, it suffices to consider the deterministic
algorithm At (for t = 1, . . . , T) that waits for the first t− 1 phases of the sequence accepting no clients and (if phase t is run)
accepts all t clients of phase t. Clearly, algorithm A1 has benefit 1. The probability that the adversary runs phase t is 1t (which
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is the probability that the adversaryADV continues after each of the first t−1 phases). So, At has benefit twith probability
1
t
and no benefit with probability 1− 1
t
. Hence, the expected benefit of At under P is 1.
The optimal benefit for a sequence produced byADV is obtained by accepting all clients of the last phase of the sequence.
Denote by pi the probability that phase i is the last phase the adversary runs. It is pT = 1T while for i = 1, . . . , T − 1 it is
pi = 1i(i+1) . We obtain that the expected optimal benefit under P is EP [BOPT] =
∑T
i=1 i · pi =
∑T
i=1
1
i
= HT . 
In the following, we present the randomized online SMP algorithm Classify. Assume that the algorithm knows in advance
the values `min and `max of theminimum andmaximumnon-zero latency bounds of any client of the sequence at any server.
Let T = `max/`min. The algorithm uses a constant parameter γ (to be defined later) and equiprobably selects an integer i from
0 to dlogγ Te − 1. When a client appears, the algorithm checks whether her latency bound at some server is in the interval[
`minγ
i, `minγ
i+1) and whether assigning the client to this server is feasible in the sense that neither the latency bound of
previously accepted clients at this server nor the latency bound of the client at this server are violated. If such a server exists,
the algorithm assigns the client to this particular server (ties are broken arbitrarily); otherwise, it rejects the client.We prove
the following theorem.
Theorem 9. Algorithm Classify has competitive ratio at most 1+ γ + 1+γln γ ln T against oblivious adversaries.
Proof. Consider a sequence of clients and denote by OPT the set of clients accepted in an optimal solution. We define a
partition ofOPT into dlogγ Te disjoint subsetsOPTi for i = 0, . . . , dlogγ Te−1. For each client c and integer i = 0, . . . , dlogγ Te−
1, denote by F ic the set of servers at which the client c has latency bound in the interval [`minγ i, `minγ i+1). A client c belongs
to OPTi if it is accepted at a server in F ic in the optimal solution.
Assume that algorithm Classify has selected integer i. Then, it considers the original sequence as a new sequence σi where
each client c has latency bound `′kc = `kc if k ∈ F ic and `′kc = 0, otherwise. Denote by Oi the optimal set of clients for σi. Observe
that the clients in OPTi form a feasible solution for sequence σi. Thus, it holds that |Oi| ≥ |OPTi|.
First, we show that the benefit Bi of the algorithm Classifywhen it selects integer i is Bi ≥ 1γ+1 |Oi| ≥ 1γ+1 |OPTi|. Denote by A
and R the sets of clients accepted and rejected, respectively, by the algorithm Classifywhen it selects integer i. For each server
k, denote by Ak the set of clients accepted at server k by algorithm Classify and by Oki the set of clients accepted at server k in
the optimal solution for σi. Since the latency bound of any client in Ak at server k is at most γ times smaller than the latency
bound of any client in R ∩ Oki at server k and since no client from R ∩ Oki can fit in server k, it holds that |Ak| ≥ 1γ |R ∩ Oki |. So,
for the benefit Bi = |A|we have
Bi ≥ 1
γ + 1 |A| +
γ
γ + 1
∑
k
|Ak|
≥ 1
γ + 1 |A ∩ Oi| +
1
γ + 1
∑
k
|R ∩ Oki |
= 1
γ + 1 (|A ∩ Oi| + |R ∩ Oi|)
= 1
γ + 1 |Oi|
≥ 1
γ + 1 |OPTi|.
Now, by linearity of expectation, we obtain that the expected benefit of the algorithm is
E[B] =
dlogγ Te−1∑
i=0
(Pr[i is selected] · Bi)
≥ 1
(1+ γ) dlogγ Te
dlogγ Te−1∑
i=0
|OPTi|
≥ 1
(1+ γ)
(
1+ logγ T
) |OPT|.
Hence, the competitive ratio of the algorithm is at most 1+ γ + 1+γln γ ln T. 
The expression in Theorem 9 is minimized to approximately 4.6 + 3.59 ln T for γ = 3.6. Note that we have assumed that
algorithm Classify knows the maximum andminimum over the non-zero latency bounds of all clients at all servers `max and
`min in advance (and, consequently, it knows their ratio T). If it only knows T, when the first client appears, it may assume
that `max = `T and `min = max{1, `/T} where ` is any non-zero latency bound of the first client appeared at some server.
Then, the analysis proceeds along very similar lines to the proof of Theorem 9 and yields a competitive ratio only a constant
factor worse than that of Theorem 9.
I. Caragiannis et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 402 (2008) 142–155 151
If T is not known in advance, we can adapt algorithm Classify by applying a recent technique from [5] to obtain an
algorithm with slightly worse competitiveness. Essentially, this algorithm tries to guess T by starting with a small estimate
of T and updating it as the sequence proceeds. The interested reader may refer to [5] for the details of the description of this
adaptation and the corresponding analysis. Here, we only state the result.
Theorem 10. There exists a randomized online SMP algorithmwith competitive ratio atmost O
(∏log∗ T
i=1 log
(i) T
)
against oblivious
adversaries that does not require knowledge of T in advance.
Note that function log(i) is defined as log(i) T = log (log(i−1) T) for i > 1 and log(1) T = log T while log∗ T denotes the number
of times we have to apply log to T in order to get a result smaller than 2.
4.2. Preemptive online algorithms
Interestingly, when preemption is allowed, constant competitiveness can be achieved even by deterministic online
algorithms. In the following, we present algorithm Preempt, a deterministic preemptive online algorithm that is 5-
competitive.
Algorithm Preemptworks as follows. When a client c appears, the algorithm Preempt attempts to assign c to some server
without preempting any clients. If this is not possible, the algorithm selects among all eligible clients (if any) for c the one
with minimum latency bound, preempts it and replaces it with client c. If no such client exists, then c is rejected. An already
accepted client c′ which resides at server kwhen c appears is eligible for c if lkc′ ≤ lkc/2.
Theorem 11. Algorithm Preempt has a competitive ratio of at most 5.
Proof. We consider a sequence of clients. We denote by Oj the set of clients that are in server j in an optimal solution. We
denote by Aj the set of clients accepted by algorithm Preempt at server j (at the end of the sequence). Let A = ⋃j Aj. We denote
R the set of clients rejected by algorithm Preempt. Finally, we denote by Pj the set of clients preempted from server j by the
algorithm. Let P = ⋃j Pj.
We use the following two lemmas.
Lemma 12. For any server j with R ∩ Oj 6= ∅, it holds that |Oj| < 2|Aj|.
Proof. Consider a client c∗ ∈ R ∩ Oj, i.e., a client which is at server j in the optimal solution and was rejected by Preempt.
Consider the client c′ with the minimum latency bound among the clients in server jwhen client c∗ appears. It is ljc′ > l
j
c∗/2,
otherwise c′ would be eligible for c∗. Since c∗ is rejected, this means that min{ljc′ , ljc∗ } clients are already in server j and hence,
|Aj| ≥ min{ljc′ , ljc∗ } > ljc∗/2 as the number of clients in server j does not decrease in later steps. Since c∗ ∈ Oj, it is ljc∗ ≥ |Oj| and
the lemma follows. 
Lemma 13. For any server j, it holds that |Pj| < 2|Aj|.
Proof. Consider a server j and let c∗ be the last client that was preempted from j, s = ljc∗ be her latency bound at j and c be
the client that replaced c∗. Since c could not be accepted at jwithout preemption and c∗ is the client that was preempted, it
holds that c∗ had the smallest latency bound among all eligible clients for c at server j and, hence, s ≤ |Aj|. In the rest of the
proof we show that |Pj| < 2s.
We first show that every client in Pj has latency bound at most s. Assume otherwise that there exists a client c′′ ∈ Pj with
latency bound ljc′′ > s. Since c
∗ is the last client preempted from server j and ljc′′ > s = ljc∗ , c′′ had been preempted before
c∗ was accepted, otherwise, c∗ would have been preempted instead of c′′. At the step when c′′ was preempted, there were
already ljc′′ clients in server j. Since the number of clients in server j does not decrease in later steps, c
∗ could not have been
accepted, a contradiction.
Now, consider the partition of Pj defined by 1+ blog sc subsets S1, . . . , S1+blog sc, with Si being the set of clients in Pj with
latency bound at server j between bs/2ic + 1 and bs/2i−1c, for i = 1, . . . , 1 + blog sc. We show that |Si| ≤ bs/2i−1c, for
i = 1, . . . , 1+ blog sc. Assume otherwise and let c′ be the last of the clients in Si which was accepted at server j. In the steps
prior to the appearance of c′, at least bs/2i−1c other clients of Si had been accepted. Each of them is either still in server jwhen
client c′ appears or has been replaced with another client that has latency bound strictly larger than bs/2i−1c, and hence, it
is not in Si. So, at least bs/2i−1c clients with latency bound at least bs/2ic+1 are in server jwhen c′ appears and none of them
is eligible for c′. Thus, the acceptance of c′ would violate her latency bound, a contradiction.
Therefore,
|Pj| =
1+blog sc∑
i=1
|Si| ≤
1+blog sc∑
i=1
bs/2i−1c ≤ 2s− 1. 
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The optimal benefit OPT is
OPT = ∑
j
|Oj|
= ∑
j
|Oj ∩ A| +
∑
j
|Oj ∩ R| +
∑
j
|Oj ∩ P|
≤ ∑
j
|Oj ∩ A| +
∑
j:Oj∩R 6=∅
|Oj| +
∑
j
|Pj|
< |A| + 2 ∑
j:Oj∩R 6=∅
|Aj| + 2
∑
j
|Aj|
≤ 5|A|.
where the second inequality follows by Lemmas 12 and 13. 
In the following, we present lower bounds on the competitiveness of any deterministic and randomized online algorithm
that allows preemption. In the proof, we make use of the following observation.
Fact 14. An online algorithm that rejects a client when it can be accepted without preempting another client has no larger benefit
than an algorithm that accepts it.
Our lower bound for deterministic algorithms is the following.
Theorem 15. For any  > 0, any deterministic online SMP algorithm that may use preemption has a competitive ratio of at least
3− .
Proof. Consider an adversary which produces a sequence of 3m2 − 1 clients on m servers where m is even. The adversary
works in three phases. The first phase has m2 steps. In each such step, a client with latency bound 1 at each server appears.
The second phase has m2 steps; in the step i of the second phase, a client with latency bound
m
2 at all servers belonging to
an appropriately defined set Mi and latency bound 0 at all other servers appears. The third phase has m2 − 1 steps; in each
such step a client with latency bound 1 at each of the servers of M1 \ M m2 appears. The adversary defines sets M1, . . . ,M m2
as follows. Initially, it sets M1 to be the set of m2 servers where the algorithm accepted the clients of the first phase. For
i = 1, . . . , m2 − 1, if the algorithm accepts the client that appears at the step i of the second phase at some server s ∈ Mi, the
adversary setsMi+1 = Mi \ {s}. Otherwise, (i.e., if the algorithm rejects the client) it arbitrarily selects a server s′ fromMi and
sets Mi+1 = Mi \ {s′}.
By Fact 14, the algorithmwill accept m2 clients during the first phase. During each step of the last twophases, the algorithm
either rejects the client or accepts it by preempting an already accepted client. This is clear for the third phase since the clients
that appear during this phase have latency bound 1 only at servers of M1; each such server contains a client already at the
end of the first phase. Now, consider the i-th step of the second phase and observe that, by the definition of theMi, the client
that appears in that step has latency bound 0 at any server where the algorithm accepted a client during steps 1, . . . , i− 1
of the second phase. Hence, any client that appears during the second phase has non-zero latency bound only at servers
where a client of latency bound 1 lies and, thus, it cannot be accepted without a preemption. So, the benefit of the algorithm
is exactly m2 .
The proof is completed by considering the following assignment of benefit 3m2 − 1. The m2 clients of the first phase are
accepted at the m2 servers not in M1; one client per server. All the
m
2 clients of the second phase are accepted at the single
server of M m
2
. Finally, the m2 − 1 clients of the third phase are accepted at the servers of M1 \M m2 ; one client per server. 
Our last result is a lower bound on the competitiveness of preemptive online algorithms that use randomization. Our
analysis is based on amartingale argument. Martingales are important sequences of random variables with very interesting
properties.
Definition 16. A sequence of random variables {Yi} = Y0, Y1, . . . is called a martingale if E [Yi+1|Yi, . . . , Y0] = Yi for every
integer i ≥ 0.
A powerful tool that provides tail inequalities for martingales is Azuma’s inequality which is stated in the following. We
remark that a slightly more general version of the version of Azuma’s inequality we use here can be found in [21].
Lemma 17 (Azuma’s Inequality [21]). Let {Yi} be a martingale and let c be such that |Yi − Yi−1| ≤ c. Then, for any λ > 0 and
integer n > 0, it holds that
Pr[|Yn − Y0| ≥ λ] ≤ 2 exp
(
− λ
2
2nc2
)
.
Theorem 18. For any  > 0, no randomized preemptive online SMP algorithm has competitive ratio better than e
e−1 −  against
oblivious adversaries.
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Proof. Consider the following adversary which produces sequences ofm clients onm servers. The clients are presented inm
steps; one client at each step. At the first step, the adversary presents a client which has latency bound 1 at each server; all
servers are permissible for that client at the first step for that client. In step i, the adversary selects uniformly at random one
out of the servers that were permissible for the client presented in step i − 1 and presents a new client which has latency
bound 1 at each server which was permissible for the client presented in step i − 1 except for the server selected by the
adversary. These are the permissible servers for the client; its latency bound on any other server is 0.
The optimal assignment has benefit m since an offline adversary can assign the client presented at the i-th step at the
server which the adversary selects at the beginning of step i + 1. We will apply Lemma 7 and show that no preemptive
deterministic online algorithm has expected benefit larger than (1 − 1/e)m + o(m). By Fact 14, it suffices to consider a
deterministic algorithmwhich never rejects a client if it can be assigned to somepermissible serverwithout any preemption.
Also, since all clients have latency bound 1 on their permissible servers, preemptions cannot improve the benefit of
the algorithm. So, we may assume that the algorithm starts by continuously accepting clients until some step when no
permissible server is available; after that step, the algorithm will not accept any more clients.
When considering step i, we say that a server is free if it has not been assigned any client in previous steps and is
permissible for the client that appears in step i. We denote by Ai the number of free servers after step i. Our proof now
proceeds as follows. We will pick step z = d(1− 1/e)(m+ 1)e and we will show that the probability that the algorithmwill
accept more than t∗ ∈ o(m) clients after step z is at most 1/m. As a corollary, the expected number of clients that will be
eventually accepted will be at most (z + t∗ − 1) Pr[Az < t∗] + m Pr[Az ≥ t∗] ≤ z + t∗, i.e., at most (1 − 1/e)m + o(m). The
theoremwill then follow by selectingm to be sufficiently large. So, the rest of the proof is devoted to prove that there exists
some t∗ ∈ o(m) such that Pr[Az ≥ t∗] ≤ 1/m.
We will use a martingale argument. Consider the sequence of random variables {Xi} for i = 0, . . . ,m − 1 defined as
follows: Xi = Aim−i − Hm−i if Ai > 0, and Xi = −Hm−u if Ai = 0, where u is the smallest integer such that Au = 0 and Au−1 > 0.
We first observe the next property of the sequence {Xi}.
Claim 19. The sequence {Xi} for i = 0, . . . ,m− 1 is a martingale.
Proof. Assume that the algorithm has run for i steps and consider step i + 1. Clearly, E [Ai+1|Ai, . . . , A0] = 0 if Ai = 0.
Otherwise, during step i+ 1, the algorithm assigns the client to some free server and, then, the adversary selects uniformly
at random amongm− i servers the one which will not be permissible for the client that will appear during step i+2. Hence,
the probability that a free server is selected by the adversary at the beginning of step i + 1 is Ai−1
m−i . Thus, the expectation of
the number of free servers after step i+ 1 when the number of free servers after step i is Ai > 0 is
E [Ai+1|Ai, . . . , A0] = Ai − 1− Ai − 1
m− i
= m− i− 1
m− i Ai −
m− i− 1
m− i .
By the definition of {Xi}, we have that Xi = −Hm−u, for any i ≥ u, and, hence, E [Xi+1|Xi, . . . , X0] = Xi, for i ≥ u. For
i = 0, . . . , u− 1 (i.e., when Ai > 0), we have that
E [Xi+1|Xi, . . . , X0] = E [Ai+1|Ai, . . . , A0]
m− i− 1 − Hm−i−1
= Ai
m− i −
1
m− i − Hm−i−1
= Ai
m− i − Hm−i
= Xi. 
Now, we will apply Azuma’s inequality on random variable Xz. In order to do this, we need upper bounds on the absolute
value of the difference between two consecutive random variables in the sequence {Xi} for i = 0, . . . , z. This is given by the
following claim.
Claim 20. For any i = 1, . . . , z, it holds that |Xi − Xi−1| ≤ 4m−z .
Proof. At the beginning, all servers are free, i.e., A0 = m. Since the algorithm assigns a client to some permissible server
when free servers exist, the number of free servers is decreased by at least 1 in each step until their number becomes zero.
Hence, Ai ≤ m− i. Also, observe that the number of free servers may decrease by at most two at each step. Using these two
facts and the definition of the random variables {Xi}, we obtain
|Xi − Xi−1| = Ai
m− i − Hm−i −
Ai−1
m− i+ 1 + Hm−i+1
= Ai
(m− i)(m− i+ 1) +
Ai − Ai−1
m− i+ 1 +
1
m− i+ 1
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≤ 4
m− i+ 1
≤ 4
m− z . 
We will also need the following technical claim.
Claim 21. Hm − Hm−z − 1 ≥ 0.
Proof. We use the inequality ln x ≤ x − 1 for x > 0, and we consider the inequalities Hi − Hi−1 = 1i ≥ ln i+1i , for
i = m− z+ 1, . . . ,m. Summing them up and subtracting 1, we obtain that
Hm − Hm−z − 1 = −1+
m∑
i=m−z+1
(Hi − Hi−1)
≥ −1+
m∑
i=m−z+1
ln
i+ 1
i
= −1+ ln m+ 1
m− z+ 1
≥ 0
where the last inequality follows since z ≥ (1− 1/e)(m+ 1). 
Now, let t be a positive integer. Observe that the definition of {Xi} yields that if Az ≥ t, then Xz ≥ tm−z − Hm−z. Hence, in order
to upper-bound the probability of the former event, we will upper-bound the probability of the latter by applying Azuma’s
inequality.
We have that
Pr [Az ≥ t] ≤ Pr
[
Xz ≥ t
m− z − Hm−z
]
= Pr
[
Xz − X0 ≥ t
m− z − Hm−z − X0
]
= Pr
[
Xz − X0 ≥ t
m− z − Hm−z − 1+ Hm
]
≤ Pr
[
|Xz − X0| ≥ t
m− z − Hm−z − 1+ Hm
]
≤ Pr
[
|Xz − X0| ≥ t
m− z
]
≤ 2 exp
−
(
t
m−z
)2
2z
(
4
m−z
)2

= 2 exp
(
− t
2
32z
)
.
The second equality follows since X0 = 1−Hm by the definition of {Xi}. The second and third inequalities follow by Claim 21
and the fourth one by applying Azuma’s inequality to the random variable Xz with λ = tm−z and c = 4m−z .
The proof of the theorem is completed by setting t = t∗ = 4√2z ln 2m ∈ o(m). 
5. Conclusions and open problems
In this paper, we have studied a particular class of games called SMP games which model the selfish behavior of clients
that wish to be assigned to servers. For this class of games, we have shown how to compute equilibria efficiently, have
assessed the impact of selfishness on system performance, have shown that the problem of optimizing performance is
computationally hard to solve even in a coordinatedway, and have presented efficient approximation and online algorithms.
Our work reveals several interesting open questions. The first one is to close the gap between our 1.58-approximation
algorithm and the inapproximability result. Special cases of the SMP problem are interesting as well. As we remarked at the
end of Section 3, instances of SMPwith latency bounds at most 3 are APX-hard while if latency bounds are either 0 or 1 the
problem can be solved optimally in polynomial time by a straightforwardmaximum bipartite matching computation. What
is the complexity of SMP instances with latency bounds at most 2? This is equivalent to the following problem which we
callMaximum Bipartite (1, 2)-Matching: we are given a bipartite graph G = (U, V, E), where E is partitioned into red and
blue edges. We wish to find a subsetM of E of maximum cardinality such that any node of U is adjacent to at most one edge
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of M, any node of V is adjacent to at most two edges of M, and any red edge of M is not adjacent to any other edge of M. To
the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been studied before.
Concerning non-preemptive online algorithms, a challenging issue is whether O(log T) competitive randomized
algorithms that do not require the knowledge of T in advance exist. In the preemptive case, it remains to close the gap
between our lower bound of 3 for deterministic algorithms and the 5-competitive algorithm Preempt. Finally, seeking the
limit of randomized preemptive online algorithms definitely deserves further investigation.
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